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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--'-STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE-

The city of Richmond by ordinance required all solicitors to pay an annual tax
before being permitted to solicit business within the city.1 Appellant, a representative of a Washington, D.C. firm, was arrested for soliciting without having
previously procured the required license. 2 Appellant was convicted and her conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.8 On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court she contended that the statute upon which her
conviction was based was unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was repugnant to the

1 Richmond City Code ( 1939) c. IO, § 23. The ordinance lays an annual license
tax in the following terms: "[Upon] ..•-Agents--Solicitors-Persons, Firms or Cor- porations engaged in business as solicitors ... $50.00 and one-half of one percentum of
the gross earnings, receipts, fees or commissions for the preceding license year in excess
of $ I ,000.00. . . ." Quoted by the Court, principal case at 58 7.
2 The firm in question employs solicitors throughout the country selling ladies' garments at $2.98 each. The solicitor obtains the order and receives a down payment
usually sufficient to pay the solicitor's commission. The order is then sent to the home
office and is filled through the mails. The record does not show whether appellant
would have been compensated by her c_ompany had she paid the tax. Yet whether the
company does or does not absorb the tax should not affect the result.
8 183 Va. 689, 33 S.E. (2d) 206 (1945).
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Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.4 Held, reversed. Taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce are unconstitutional and the court in
each case· will look to the practical consequences of such taxes to see if such discrimination· is present. 5 Nippert
City of Richmond, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct.

v.

586.
Until 1938, while the Court was dominated by the belief tKat interstate
com_merce should be free from all state taxation, taxes similar ii;i design to the
impost sought to be imposed in the principal case were consistently invalidated.6
Then in Western Live Stock 'll. Bureau of Revenue,1 the Court i;ejected its
formalistic approach to this phase of the commerce question and conceded that
interstate commerce could be made to "pay its way" with the added corollary
that such commerc~.should not be exposed to burdens not borne by local business.8 This departure was dictated largely by the compelling economic needs of
4 Article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3, "Congress shall have the power to regulat<t commerce ...
among the several States...."
5 The statute also required that in applying for the p~rmit, "evidence of the good
character of the individual, the members of the firm, or the chief officers of the corporatio_n, as the case may be" had to be produced. The Director of Public Safety was to
make a reasonable investigation and if he was satisfied that the applicant was of a good
moral character and fit to engage in the proposed business he was to issue the permit.
The appellant, before the United States Supreme Court, argued that this discretionary power given to the director was sufficient to invalidate the measure without respect to the character of the tax. This contention had not been relied upon in the lower
court and the court did not consider this question. It does seem, however, that if the
power given to the director can be shown to be a reasonable safety meastJre it would not
be open to attack.
6 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 u;.s. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592 (1887),
was the first case involving such a tax to coive before the Court. There the Court flatly
said at p. 497, "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same
amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce...." Since then, and until 1938,
nineteen such taxes have been invalidated, culminating with Real Silk Hosiery Mills v.
Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 45 S. Ct. 529 (1925). For specific references to these cases
and an analysis of them in respect to their possible effect upon a sales tax of the
type considered in the Berwind-White case, see Lockhart, "The Sales Tax in Interstate
Commerce,"· 52 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1939). For bibliographical material on this subject generally see 43 M1cH. L. REv. 761 at 774-775, items 47-51 (1945).
7 303 U.S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546 (1938). Here New Mexico levied a 2 per cent tax
on the gross receipts from the sale of advertising by those engaged in the business of
publishing newspapers or magazines. The tax was levied upon a firm whose only office
was in New Mexico and whose journal had circulation in other states. The Court's
reasoning is noteworthy for the tax could have been supported qn the basis of orthodox
doctrine.
' ·
·
8 In the Western Livestock case, 303 U.S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546 (1938), the Court
stressed the fact that this was a tax that could not be repeated in other states. (If freedom from cumulative burdens meant only protection against the imposition of the same
tax by other taxing authorities it would afford but slight protection. But it seems clear
from later cases that the Court is thinking of this freedom in a more inclusive sense.)
But where other states would be able to tax the same receipts the tax was condemned.
See Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938). Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939).
:
' Generally, see Traynor, "State Taxation and the Commerce Cla11se in the Supreme
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the states and, the belated realization that the commerce clause does not compel
complete "immunization" of interstate commerce to state regulation. This
"new" approach led to the upholding of a New York 9 sales tax that applied to
interstate as well as local sales since the court could see no possibility of discrimination against interstate commerce. 10 Also an annual fee imposed upon each
vehicle used in "peddling" goods brought into the state by an out-.of-state vendor
has been upheld on the ground that the tax was imposed upon the intrastate
activity of "peddling" and not on interstate commerce. 11 In the light of this
background the court had to examine the contention of the City of Richmond
that the tax it now sought to impose was valid since it came within the "rationale" of this "new" approach. 12 The logic ·of the appellee takes this form; "That
the tax was imposed upon events whicli occurred within the taxing jurisdiction
and which are separate and distinct from the transportation or intercourse which
is interstate commerce." And appellee concludes that since the local delivery
could be made the jurisdictional base for the sales tax in the Berwind-White
case,18 the local activity of solicitation could serve the same purpose here. Since
Richmond placed its chief reliance on the Berwind-White case, Justice Rutledge,
writing the opinion of the Court rejecting this contention, confines his discusCourt, 1938 Term," 28 CAL. L. REv: 168 (1940); Morrison, "State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce," 36 ILL. L. REV. 727 (1942).
However, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950
(1944), the Court did not seem to be worried about the possibility of cumulative burdens. As to whether the Court may distinguish transportation froi:n commercial enterprise in their approach to this problem, see Lockhart, "Gross Receipts on Interstate
Transportation and Communication," 57 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1943).
0 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388 (1940).
This decision has been commonly interpreted to mean that no other state would be
able to tax the proceeds taxed by New York. If this were not so then the interstate
vendor would be exposed to multiple burdens. It seems therefore that the state of
market will be the one permitted to impose this tax. In view of this approach the decision in the Western Livestock case cited in notes 7 and 8, infra, will have to be reconsidered. The cases can be distinguished in terms_ of the object taxed, but, whereas
formerly the court looked to the obj.ect of the tax without considering the effect of
the measure of the tax, it seems that its present approach demands that it consider both
these factors. For a thorough discussion of gross receipt taxes generally, see Powell,
"New Light on Gross Receipt Taxes;" 53 HARV. L. REv. 909 {1940).
10 But see Best v. Maxwell, 3 l I U.S. 454, 61 S. Ct. 334 (1940); McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 60 S. Ct. 504 (1940).
11 Caskey Baking Co., Inc. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. II7, 61 S. Ct. 881 (1941).
This distinction between "peddling" and solicitation was recognized as early as the
Robbins case cited in note 6, supra. For general material on this subject: WRIGHT,
HAWKERS AND WALKEJlS IN EARLY AMERICA (1927).
12 Some reliance was also placed upon more recent cases such as International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 322 U. S. 340, 64 S. Ct. 1019 (1944);
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 64 S. Ct. 1028
(1944).
18 Although the Court in the Berwind-White case does say, "Here the tax is conditioned upon a local activity, delivery of goods within-the state upon their purchase for
consumption," 309 U.S. 33 at 58, 60 S. Ct. 388, it went on to say, "The effect of.the
tax, even though measured by the sales price, as has been shown, neither discriminates
nor obstructs interstate commerce more than numerous other state taxes which have
repeatedly been sustained as involving no prohibited regulation of interstate commerce."
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sion largely to those factors which differentiate the present tax and the sales tax
in that case. His analysis develops the following differences: ( 1) The business
taxed in the Berwind-White case was continuous whereas in the priµcipal case
there was no showing that the appellant carried on a regular course of business.14
(2) The tax levied by New York was proportional to the volume of business
carried on while the present fax, since it required the payment of a fixed sum for
the privilege of soliciting business, bore no such proportional relationship •. (3)
The flat tax, since it reached commerc~ at its incipient stage, would tend to divert
it from such channels and this exclusionary effect would be magnified if the tax
were raised or if it were adopted by other municipalities within the state. ( 4) The
recognition that the present tax, though professing to apply alike to all solicitors,
was in reality directed at out-of-state competition inasmuch as the retail merchants within the st~te would not ordinar'ily resort to this type of distribution.1~
This analysis serves effectually ;o distinguish the cases and is sufficient justification for condemning the Richmond tax. Far from restricting the taxing power
of local soyereignties the opinion emphasizes that interstate commerce should
bear a "fair share of the cost of local government." 16 It demands only that local
governments, in framing taxing legislation, be selective in order to avoid discriminatory results. Undoubtedly this tax, if applied so as to reach only those
soljcitors regularly engaged in carrying on business within the city, would be
14 lt is rather unfortunate that the Court still gives credence to McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327, 64 S. Ct. 1023 (1944). In denying the power of the state of
Arkansas to levy a sales tax upon goods shipped by a Tennessee vendor into Arkan'sas,
the Court distinguished the Berwind-White case by pointing out that the Tennessee
corporation, unlike the Pennsylvania corporation, did not maintain an office· in the
vendee's state and that the sale in this case was completed in the vendor's state. Since
mere solicitation, if regular and continuous, can be considered "doing business," [International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 154] the distinction in terms of the nature of business done seems no longer to be sound: and since
Justice Rutledge concedes that " •.. the situation is difficult to think of in which some
incident of an interstate transaction taking place within a state could not be segregated
by an.act of mental gymnastics and made the fulcrum of tlie tax .•.," (id. at 589) the
distinction in terms of final delivery seems also to be without basis.
15 Principal case at 595. " ••. Provincial interests and local power are at their
maximum weight in bringing about acceptance of this type of legislation." This is
giving expression to Justice Stone's "political representation" doctrine that, while state
legislation should be given fullest consideration, the Court should at the same time
consider whether such legislation is imposed upon those whose views can be voiced
through their representatives. For an expression of this approach, see South Carolina
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 at 184, note 2, 58 S.
Ct. 510 (1938) (state police regulation of commerce); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White,
309 U.S. 33 at 36, note 2, 60 S. Ct. 388 (1940) (state taxation of interstate commerce) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 3 IO U.S. 8 8 at 9 5, 60 S. Ct. 73 6 ( I 940) (civil liberties); United States.v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778 (1938)
( federal police legislati~n).
·
16 Principal case at 594. "There is no lack of power in the state or municipalities
to see that interstate commerce bears with local trade its fair share of the cost o,f
local government. . . ." Then, after stating th.e Court's position as to discriminatory
taxes, Justice Rutledge continues, "other types of taxes are available for reaching both
portions which do not involve the forbidden evils or the necessity for putting them upon
some commerce in order to reach other."
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valid. So applied it would be free from attack as tending to exclude commerce,
and th_e possibility of similar impositions by other municipalities would not be
relevant; 17 the only other danger that would have to be guarded against would
be that of having the measure construed as an attempt to suppress interstate business under the guise of taxation. Income from sales completed by solicitors who
would not come within the concept of doing business might be reached by some
kind of gross receipts or net income tax. The varying factors involved in each of
the commerce clause cases highlight the difficulty that would face Congress if the
Court should accept the view of some of its members that only a measure discriminatory on its face be invalidated and that Congress be given the task of
shaping national policy with respect to other local legislation affecting interstate
commerce.18 In the light of these considerations the position taken by the Court
that it will continue to decide "single local controversies" probably offers the best
solution to this problem. Aside from its assertion that it will continue to invalidate local taxes that are discriminatory and that it will look beyond the face of
the statute to evaluate the practical consequences of the legislation involved, the
striking part of its decision is the fact that the burden of justifying its levy is made
to fall upon the state. 19
George Brody, S.Ed.

